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EXPORTING COMPONENTS OF PATENTED PRODUCTS: 
A UNIQUE WAY TO INFRINGE 
Michael A. Sanzo* 
For the most part, United States patent law is only concerned 
with activities that take place in the United States and its 
territories. One of the rare exceptions to this may be found in 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f). The first part of this statute makes it an act of 
infringement for a party in the United States to supply a foreign 
entity with components of a patented invention when the 
components are uncombined as sent but are supplied in a manner 
that induces their being combined abroad to form a product 
covered by the patent.1 Remarkably, liability may occur even 
though an infringing product has never been made, used, or sold in 
the United States and without the patent owner having experienced 
any demonstrable harm.2 
This article argues that the most recent interpretation of this 
statute by the Federal Circuit is so vague and expansive that it will 
be almost impossible for manufacturers operating in the United 
States to assess and avert the risk of patent infringement 
associated with the sale of components to foreign entities. The 
consequent incentive is for the manufacturer to either forgo the 
sale or to relocate manufacturing facilities outside the United 
States. Thus, § 271(f), which was enacted based in part on the idea 
that it would improve the United States trade balance and 
encourage the development of United States jobs, actually does the 
opposite. At a minimum, the language used in the statute should be 
                                                
 * Mike Sanzo is a patent attorney working in the areas of chemistry, 
biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals. Dr. Sanzo can be reached at 
mike@msanzolaw.com.  
 1 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2012).  
 2 James R. Farrand, Territoriality and Incentives Under the Patent Laws: 
Overreaching Harms U.S. Economic and Technological Interests, 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1215, 1216–17 (2006). 
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Activities occurring in other countries generally have no effect 
with respect to the infringement of a United States patent.3 There 
is, however, an exception. Under certain circumstances, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(f) allows the owner of a patented invention to sue a person 
or entity that has merely supplied components of the invention to a 
foreign entity.4 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) reads as follows: 
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be 
supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial 
portion of the components of a patented invention, where 
such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in 
such manner as to actively induce the combination of such 
components outside of the United States in a manner that 
would infringe the patent if such combination occurred 
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 
                                                
 3 Id.; see also Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Divided Infringement: Expanding 
the Extraterritorial Scope of Patent Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281 (2007) 
(arguing that U.S. patent law needs to become more extraterritorial). 
 4 Farrand, supra note 2; Wasserman, supra note 3.  
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(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be 
supplied in or from the United States any component of a 
patented invention that is especially made or especially 
adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in 
whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made 
or adapted and intending that such component will be 
combined outside of the United States in a manner that 
would infringe the patent if such combination occurred 
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.5 
Remarkably, § 271(f) may be invoked even though the act of 
providing individual components of a combination invention is 
not, in itself, infringing, and even though the party receiving the 
components in a foreign country does not itself engage in any 
infringing activities. Thus, unlike other sections of United States 
law dealing with inducing infringement6 or contributory 
infringement,7 there is no requirement in § 271(f) that there have 
been any direct infringement of a United States patent, i.e., there 
need not have been the making, use, or sale of an invention in the 
United States or its territories.8 
Several of the most important requirements that are needed for 
a patent holder to invoke § 271(f) are those that are italicized in the 
statute as shown above. Under paragraph two, at least one 
component transferred must be “especially made or especially 
adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing 
use.”9 This provides a simple, straightforward test that can be used 
by manufacturers exporting goods to comfortably conclude that 
their activities will not infringe this section of the statute. 
                                                
 5 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012) (emphasis added) (The statute was signed into law 
as part of the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984.). 
 6 § 271(b). 
 7 Id. 
 8 For a review on inducing patent infringement, see Timothy R. Holbrook, The 
Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent Infringement, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1008 (2016). 
 9 § 271(f). 
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Unfortunately, the law is much more complicated with respect 
to paragraph one. The most important limitations in this section 
with respect to assessing whether a transfer creates an infringement 
risk will typically be that (a) all, or a substantial portion of, the 
components of the patented invention must have been provided to 
a foreign party; and (b) this must have been done in a manner that 
induces the subsequent combining of components in an 
“infringing” manner.10 In December of 2014, the Federal Circuit 
decided Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp.,11 and defined 
these restrictions in such broad and vague terms as to raise the 
question of whether these restrictions significantly limit the statute 
at all. Under this decision, a United States manufacturer will 
generally find it almost impossible to determine if the transfer of 
components to foreign entities is within the scope of § 271(f)(1). 
Clarity may improve however. In response to a Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari filed in June of 2015,12 the Supreme Court 
invited the Solicitor General to file a Brief expressing the views of 
the United States.13 This Brief was filed on May 11, 201614 and, on 
June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court granted the Petition.15 It is 
possible that, in its decision, the Supreme Court will redefine at 
                                                
 10 More specifically, the invention would be a direct infringement if made in 
the United States. 
 11 773 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 12 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp., 
2015 WL 3941490 (June 26, 2015) (No. 14-1538), www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/life-technologies-corporation-v-promega-corporation/. 
 13 Supreme Court of the United States, Order List: 577 U.S.: Orders in 
Pending Cases (Oct. 5, 2015), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/100515zor_4f15.pdf (noting 
the order for No: 14-1538 inviting the Solicitor General to file a brief for the 
United States). 
 14 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 23, Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp., 2016 WL 2765361 
(May 11, 2016) (No. 14-1538), www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/life-
technologies-corporation-v-promega-corporation/. 
 15 See Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016). The Court 
has limited its review to the question of whether supplying a single, commodity 
component of a multi-component invention is an infringing act under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(f)(1) (2012). It will not address the question of whether a single entity can 
“actively induce” itself to infringe. 
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least some of the terms used in § 271(f) in a clearer and more 
restrictive way. 
This article argues that, apart from some limited instances in 
which Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions have provided 
clear guidelines,16 United States manufacturers must currently 
assume that the transfer of components to foreign entities for 
assembly and sale abroad carries with it a substantial risk of patent 
infringement. The article also suggests that § 271(f), and 
particularly its first paragraph, unfairly rewards United States 
patent holders at the expense of United States manufacturers. At a 
time when manufacturing in the United States is near an all time 
low, and the United States trade imbalance is near an all time high, 
this statute provides a clear incentive for companies to move their 
manufacturing operations outside the country. Until a more 
reasonable statutory construction is arrived at or, more 
optimistically, the statute is eliminated entirely, companies need to 
be aware of the risk it presents with respect to exportation of 
goods. 
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) was enacted in response to the 1972 
Supreme Court decision, Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp.17 This case involved an appeal by Deepsouth of a lower 
court injunction barring it from distributing or using machinery for 
the deveining of shrimp because this would infringe patent claims 
owned by Laitram.18 The claims were directed at a “slitter” (which 
was designed to mechanically generate slices in deshelled shrimp 
in a way that exposed the sandy “veins” running along their backs) 
and at a “tumbler” (which was used after the slitter to mechanically 
                                                
16 Regarding the transfer of tangible subject matter and the use of the actual 
materials sent in an infringing product abroad, see Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T 
Corp, 127 S.Ct. 1746 (2007). Regarding the infringement of method claims, see 
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 315 Fed. 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 17 406 U.S. 518 (1972). 
 18 Id. at 519. 
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remove veins).19 Both the slitter and tumbler were “combination 
inventions,” i.e., they were made up of components that were 
known in the art but which were combined in a new and 
nonobvious way.20 
There was no dispute that the injunction that Deepsouth had 
received prevented it from making, using, or selling slitters or 
tumblers within the scope of Laitram’s claims in the United 
States.21 However, Deepsouth argued that, since the individual 
components of the devices were not covered by the claims and 
since the patents only applied to activities occurring in the United 
States, it should not be liable for past sales of components to 
foreign entities and the injunction should be modified to recognize 
its right to continue these sales in the future.22 
Although the district court agreed with Deepsouth’s 
argument,23 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.24 
The appellate court argued that to “make” an invention in the 
context of the patent statute means “the substantial manufacture of 
the constituent parts of the machine.”25 It stated: 
The Constitutional mandate [to accord patent protection] 
cannot be limited to just manufacturing and selling within 
the United States. The infringer would then be allowed to 
reap the fruits of the American economy—technology, 
labor, materials, etc.—but would not be subject to the 
responsibilities of the American patent laws. We cannot 
permit an infringer to enjoy these benefits and then be 
                                                
 19 Id. at 520. 
 20 Id. at 520–21. 
 21 Id. at 522. 
 22 Id. at 520–24. Although the components were not combined in the United 
States, there was no doubt that Deepsouth recognized that they would be 
combined to form a shrimp deveining machine once delivered. The components 
were shipped to foreign customers in three separate boxes which could be 
assembled to form a complete machine in less than an hour. 
 23 Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 310 F. Supp. 926, 929 (E. D. LA 
1970), rev’d, 443 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1971), rev’d and remanded, 406 U.S. 518 
(1972). 
 24 Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1971), 
rev’d and remanded, 406 U.S. 518 (1972). 
 25 Id. at 938–39. 
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allowed to strip away a portion of the patentee’s 
protection.26 
The Supreme Court granted a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
and, on May 30, 1972, completely rejected the holdings of the 
lower court: 
The Court of Appeals, believing that the word “makes” 
should be accorded “a construction in keeping with the 
ordinary meaning of that term,” held against Deepsouth on 
the theory that “makes” “means what it ordinarily 
connotes—the substantial manufacture of the constituent 
parts of the machine.” . . . [W]e find the Fifth Circuit’s 
definition unacceptable because it collides head on with a 
line of decisions so firmly embedded in our patent law as to 
be unassailable absent a congressional recasting of the 
statute.27 
The Court emphasized that, in order for there to be an 
inducement to infringe, direct infringement must have occurred.28 
This requires the making, use, or sale of a patented invention in the 
United States or its territories. Since an invention that is a 
combination of components does not exist unless all of the 
components are assembled, the sale of uncombined components 
cannot constitute an infringement.29 The Court concluded that: 
[W]e note that what is at stake here is the right of American 
companies to compete with an American patent holder in foreign 
markets. Our patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial 
effect; “these acts of Congress do not, and were not intended to, 
operate beyond the limits of the United States. . . .” To the degree 
that the inventor needs protection in markets other than those of 
this country, the wording of 35 U.S.C. §§ 154 and 271 reveals a 
congressional intent to have him seek it abroad through patents 
                                                
 26 Id. (citations omitted). Although this decision was written prior to the 
enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012), the court, remarkably, seems to believe 
that United States patents accord their owners rights with respect to foreign 
markets. 
 27 Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 528 (citations omitted). 
 28 Id. at 526. 
 29 Id. at 526–31. 
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secured in countries where his goods are being used. Respondent 
holds foreign patents; it does not adequately explain why it does 
not avail itself of them.30 
It is worth noting that the Court recognized that it is not just the 
rights of United States patent holders that were at stake, but also 
the right of other United States companies to compete in foreign 
commerce.31 This recognition was sorely lacking in the subsequent 
legislative effort that resulted in the adoption of section § 271(f).32 
B. Enactment of Legislation33 
Although twelve years passed from the time that Deepsouth 
was decided until the adoption of § 271(f), the legislative history of 
the statute leaves no doubt that it was enacted in response to the 
Supreme Court’s decision.34 At the time that the relevant 
legislation was introduced, Robert Kastenmeier, the sponsor in the 
House of Representatives, stated: 
The second part of this bill [the part concerned with 271(f)] 
provides greater protection for U.S. patent holders when copiers 
produce all of the parts of a patented product in the country but 
who move offshore for final assembly before export. This proposal 
responds to a suggestion made by the Supreme Court in Deepsouth 
                                                
 30 Id. at 531 (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856)) (citations 
omitted). 
 31 Id. 
 32 There were, however, four justices who dissented and agreed with the Court 
of Appeals that the invention in this case should be considered to have been 
made in the United States by Deepsouth. These judges seem to take the view 
that the patent statute is infringed when an invention is essentially or 
substantially made in the United States. See id. at 532–34. 
 33 To find a summary of the progression of the legislation, see William R. 
Thornewell II, Patent Infringement Prevention and the Advancement of 
Technology: Application of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to Software and “Virtual 
Components”, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2815, 2816–19 (2005). 
 34 The proposal to add section (f) to 35 U.S.C. § 271, was included as part of 
the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984. See S 1535, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(June 23 , 1983)); 129 CONG. REC. S9005-06 (June 23, 1983); H.R. 4526, 98th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 18, 1983). 
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Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972) for a 
legislative solution to this issue.35 
A committee report characterized the corresponding Senate 
Bill as follows: 
The bill simply amends the patent law so that when 
components are supplied for assembly abroad to 
circumvent a patent, the situation will be treated the same 
as when the invention is “made” or “sold” in the United 
States. (Patent infringement currently is defined as making, 
using, or selling an invention in the United States.) 
The bill is needed to help maintain a climate in the 
United States conducive to invention, innovation, and 
investment. Permitting the subterfuge which is allowed 
under the Deepsouth interpretation of the patent law 
weakens confidence in patents among businesses and 
investors.36 
Later, the same report says: 
Subsection (b)(3) of Section 2 will prevent copiers from 
avoiding U.S. patents by shipping overseas the components 
of a product patented in this country so that the assembly of 
the components will be completed abroad. This proposal 
responds to a comment by the United States Supreme Court 
in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 
(1972), calling for a legislative solution to close a loophole 
in patent law. 37 
The arguments quoted above, and many others made during the 
enactment of § 271(f), seem exaggerated. Although the Supreme 
Court did indicate that it would not expand the reach of patent law 
to include activities occurring outside the United States in the 
absence of a clear and certain signal from Congress,38 there is 
                                                




 36 S. REP. NO. 98-663, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3 (Oct. 5, 1984). 
 37 Id. at 6. 
 38 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972). 
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nothing to justify the suggestion that the Court was “calling for a 
legislative solution” to close a “loophole” in the law.39 The 
characterization of Deepsouth as having engaged in a “subterfuge” 
and the Supreme Court’s decision as having been based on a defect 
in the law characterizes the comments of almost every organization 
and individual that weighed in on the legislation during 
congressional hearings. For example, Donald Banner, speaking 
behalf of Intellectual Property Owners, Inc., stated: 
The existing patent law on this point is unfair. It permits a 
subterfuge. The law should not permit substantially all the 
manufacturing activity to take place in the United States and yet 
allow the patent to be avoided by a technicality.40 
Similarly, speaking for the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association, Bernarr Pravel suggested: 
We believe that a patentee, such as Laitram, should 
have the right to benefit from his invention. The holding in 
the Deepsouth Case enables domestic copiers to circumvent 
the protection afforded by the patent laws by taking simple 
evasive production and marketing tactics. This loophole in 
the law negatively affects the patentees’ ability to export 
his invention or license others to do so. Defeating the 
expectation of innovative companies of benefitting from 
export trade is a severe disincentive, serious injustice, and 
is especially contrary to current economic policies designed 
to reduce United States trade deficits.41 
Others supporting§ 271(f) included the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”),42 Chemical Manufacturers 
                                                
 39 See id. at 531. 
 40 Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 46 (1984) (statement of Donald W. Banner, Intellectual 
Property Owners, Inc.). 
 41 Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 61 (1984) (statement of Bernarr R. Pravel, American 
Intellectual Property Law Association). 
 42 Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the 
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Association, and National Association of Manufacturers43 and 
private companies such as Monsanto and Procter & Gamble.44 The 
only person or entity who seems to have expressed a substantial 
concern about the wisdom of the legislation was Peter Maggs, a 
professor of law at the University of Illinois: 
A closer look should be taken at the attempt to reverse the 
Deepsouth decision. It seems quite possible that if this 
legislation is enacted, copiers will merely shift production 
operations overseas, beyond the reach of the U.S. patent 
system. This would mean a loss of jobs in the United 
States, with no real gain for holders of United States 
patents. Indeed, along these economic lines an argument 
could be made for legislation providing that manufacture of 
goods for export in general does not constitute an 
infringement of a U.S. patent.45 
Apart from the brief objection noted above, no person or entity 
seems to have considered the possibility that a “legislative 
solution” might not be needed, or that trying to impose one might 
                                                                                                         
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 19 (1984) (statement of Hon. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, 
Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks and Rene D. 
Tegtmeyer, Assistant Commissioner for Patents, Patent and Trademark Office). 
 43 Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 169 (1984) (statement of Richard C. Witte, Chemical 
Manufacturers Association, and National Association of Manufacturers). 
 44 Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 151 (1984) (statement of John E. Maurer, General 
Consulting Attorney, Monsato Company); see also Ronald W. Reagan, 
Statement on Signing the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, REAGAN 
LIBRARY (Nov. 9, 1984), 
https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1984/110984e.htm 
(“[The legislation] also closes a loophole in existing law which permitted 
copiers to export jobs and avoid liability by arranging for final assembly of 
patented machines to occur offshore.”). 
 45 Innovation and Patent Law Reform: Hearing on H.R. 3285, H.R. 3286, and 
H.R. 3605 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of 
Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 1735 (1984) (comments on S. 
1535 submitted by Peter B. Maggs, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-
Champaign). 
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not be a good idea. The sending of parts abroad by Deepsouth did 
not deprive Laitram of any profits in the United States or prevent 
Laitram from selling its machinery in other countries. What 
commentators characterized as a “loophole”46 might equally have 
been characterized as a well-established, bright-line principle that 
one cannot infringe a patent unless one actually, not 
approximately, makes or does something covered by the claims. 
Similarly, what commentators referred to as a “technicality”47 is 
based on the principle that patent law cannot legitimately extend 
beyond a country’s own borders, an idea rooted in international 
comity.48 Finally, the fact that Deepsouth did not assemble the 
components of Laitram’s machine prior to sending them to foreign 
countries could just as easily be described as an attempt to avoid 
infringing Laitram’s United States patents as an attempt at 
subterfuge. 
During the enactment of § 271(f), there were suggestions that 
patent law as expressed in Deepsouth damaged the trade balance of 
the United States and led to a loss of United States jobs.49 In fact, 
the opposite appears more likely. After the Supreme Court 
decision, but before the enactment of § 271(f), Deepsouth could 
continue to employ people to manufacture the components that 
were being shipped overseas.50 After the enactment of § 271(f), this 
was no longer possible, and there is no reason to assume that 
                                                
 46 See, e.g., Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 
1841, supra note 44. 
 47 See, e.g., Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 
1841, supra note 43. 
 48 For a discussion of comity in the context of patent law, see Farrand, supra 
note 2, at 1220–25. 
 49 See, Thornewell, Patent Infringement Prevention and the Advancement of 
Technology: Application of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to Software and "Virtual 
Components," 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2815, 2835-2836 (2005); see also S. REP. 
NO. 98-663, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3 (Oct. 5, 1984). Evidently those making 
such allegations thought that their validity was self-evident and provided no 
actual support for these ideas. See id.  
 50 Compare Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 
(1972) (indicating that, in the absence of an intent by Deepsouth that its 
production and sales activity would lead to the use of deveiners in the US, there 
can be no infringement), with 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012) (suggesting the 
opposite). 
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customers would then be forced to buy machines or components 
from Laitram. Instead, customers might find a foreign supplier or, 
if profits warranted it, Deepsouth itself might move its 
manufacturing operation overseas. In either case, the effect of 
§ 271(f) is to foster a loss of United States jobs and trade. 
C. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.51 
In 2001, AT&T filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, alleging that Microsoft had 
infringed AT&T’s claims to an apparatus for recording speech.52 
The undisputed facts were that Microsoft’s Windows program 
included code which, after installation, allowed computers to 
compress and encode speech in a manner similar to the apparatus 
claimed by AT&T.53 Microsoft transferred this software from the 
United States to foreign manufacturers on a master disk or by 
electronic transmission, and the software was then copied and 
installed on computers sold abroad.54 Although the software, prior 
to installation, clearly did not infringe any patent claims, AT&T 
alleged that it was a component of its claimed invention which, 
when combined with a computer overseas, constituted an 
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).55 
Microsoft denied any liability based primarily on two 
arguments: (1) software is intangible information and, as such, 
cannot be characterized as a “component” of an invention as this 
term is used in § 271(f); and (2) the software code installed on the 
foreign computers was not “supplied” from the United States but 
rather generated abroad.56 The District Court did not accept these 
arguments and held in favor of AT&T.57 The decision was affirmed 
on appeal to the Federal Circuit and then taken up for review by 
the Supreme Court.58 
                                                
 51 127 S.Ct. 1746 (2007). 
   52 U.S. Patent No. RE32,580 (filed Sept. 18, 1986). 
 53 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1750. 
 54 Id. at 1751, 1753. 
 55 Id. at 1753. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id.  
 58 Id. 
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With Justice Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court rulings and accepted both 
arguments made by Microsoft.59 The Court held that section 271(f) 
only applies to components that are amenable to being combined to 
form a patented invention.60 Software is not combinable unless it is 
part of an activating medium, and therefore software code, as an 
idea without physical embodiment, is not a component within the 
meaning of the statute.61 Thus, Microsoft could not be liable for 
infringement solely because the code that it had supplied was 
loaded on computers.62 
The second issue addressed by the Court was whether the 
§ 271(f) requirement, that an infringer must have “supplied” 
components of an invention, means that the same components sent 
must also be the ones in the final invention or, if instead, copies of 
the components sent will suffice.63 Here, the Supreme Court took 
the view that § 271(f) only applies to situations in which the 
components sent and the components used in the invention 
assembled abroad are identical.64 It held that: 
Section 271(f) prohibits the supply of components “from 
the United States . . . in such manner as to actively induce 
the combination of such components.” § 271(f)(1) 
(emphasis added). Under this formulation, the very 
components supplied from the United States, and not 
copies thereof, trigger § 271(f) liability when combined 
abroad to form the patented invention at issue. Here, as we 
                                                
 59 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1753. 
 60 Id. at 1755. 
 61 Id. 
 62 This view may have important consequences in the area of biotechnology. 
Genes are essentially abstract code expressed in the form of nucleotides 
arranged on a double stranded biopolymer. Genes reproduced and transferred 
from one organism to another would not appear to be supplied components 
within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012). 
 63 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1756–57; see also AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 
414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 437 (2007), and order 
recalled and vacated, 227 Fed. Appx. 920 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (asserting that, “for 
software ‘components,’” the act of copying is subsumed in the act of 
“supplying”). 
 64 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1757. 
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have repeatedly noted, the copies of Windows actually 
installed on the foreign computers were not themselves 
supplied from the United States. Indeed, those copies did 
not exist until they were generated by third parties outside 
the United States . . . . The absence of anything addressing 
copying in the statutory text weighs against a judicial 
determination that replication abroad of a master 
dispatched from the United States “supplies” the foreign-
made copies from the United States within the intendment 
of § 271(f).65 
In the last portion of the opinion, the Court emphasized that, 
despite the passage of § 271(f) by Congress, there is a strong 
presumption against extraterritoriality that should act as a restraint 
against expansive interpretations of this section of the law66 and 
rejected the view that the ease with which infringement can be 
avoided should be a substantial factor in deciding how to interpret 
§ 271(f)(1).67 
On a technical level, Microsoft establishes that the components 
referred to in 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) are limited to tangible subject 
matter and that the actual material sent from the United States must 
itself be combined with other elements to establish an infringing 
invention.68 More generally, it indicates that the Supreme Court is 
very cognizant of the potential issues of extraterritoriality posed by 
this statute and that they are likely to be reluctant to construe its 
terms expansively in the future.69 
D. Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Medical70 
This case has a complicated litigation history, which, for the 
most part, is of no importance to the present discussion. Of 
relevance is that Cardiac Pacemakers sued St. Jude for infringing 
patent claims to methods of using implantable cardioverter 
                                                
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 1758–59. 
 67 Id. at 1760. 
 68 Id. at 1755. 
 69 Id. at 1759–60. 
 70 Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
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defibrillators (“ICDs”) in the District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana.71 The court held that 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) 
applies to method claims and that St. Jude’s shipment of ICDs 
abroad could result in a violation of that section of the statute.72 St. 
Jude appealed this holding, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision. St. Jude then filed a petition for rehearing 
en banc, which was granted.73 
The en banc court overruled both the district court and its own 
previous decision and held that method claims are not covered by 
§ 271(f).74 One reason for this is that, like the abstract information 
discussed in Microsoft, individual steps in a process claim are not 
tangible components capable of being transferred in the sense of 
the statute.75 Thus, the court stated: 
In interpreting the terms of Section 271(f), it is critical to 
recall what a “patented invention” consists of when method 
patents are at issue. We have noted “the distinction between 
a claim to a product, device, or apparatus, all of which are 
tangible items, and a claim to a process, which consists of a 
series of acts or steps.” Thus, a component of a tangible 
product, device, or apparatus is a tangible part of the 
product, device, or apparatus, whereas a component of a 
method or process is a step in that method or process. As 
we demonstrate herein, this fundamental distinction 
between claims to a product, device, or apparatus on one 
hand and claims to a process or method on the other, is 
critical to the meaning of the statute and dooms Cardiac’s 
argument on this issue.76 
                                                
 71 Id. at 1352. 
 72 Id. at 1359. The district court relied on a previous Federal Circuit decision, 
Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366 
(2005), in holding that method claims could be infringed under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(f) (2012). Id. 
 73 Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 315 Fed. Appx. 273 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
 74 Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 576 F.3d at 1362. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 1362 (citations omitted). 
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Importantly, the court draws a distinction between the tangible 
compositions or devices that may be used in performing the steps 
of a method and the steps themselves: 
Cardiac disagrees that a component of a patented method is 
a step of that method. Instead, Cardiac urges us to adopt a 
definition of “component” that would encompass “the 
apparatus that performed the process.” That position is 
clearly contrary to the text of Section 271(f). It is not even 
supported by the lone amicus brief we have received in 
favor of including method patents within Section 271(f)’s 
reach.77 
Thus, it is the steps that are the components referred to in 
§ 271(f) and not the tangible materials used in performing the 
steps. In order to infringe under § 271(f), a United States company 
would have to supply a foreign party with a method step, and this 
is not possible under the way in which the term “supply” has been 
construed: 
Although such patented methods do have components, as 
indicated, Section 271(f) further requires that those 
components be “supplied.” That requirement eliminates 
method patents from Section 271(f)’s reach. The ordinary 
meaning of “supply” is to “provide that which is required,” 
or “to furnish with . . . supplies, provisions, or equipment.” 
These meanings imply the transfer of a physical object. 
Supplying an intangible step is thus a physical 
impossibility, a position that not even Cardiac seems to 
dispute . . . . As we have noted before, “it is difficult to 
conceive how one might supply or cause to be supplied all 
or a substantial portion of the steps in a patented method in 
the sense contemplated by” Section 271(f).78 
III. PROMEGA CORP. V. LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORP.79 
Short tandem repeats (STRs) are sequence elements that are 
repeated multiple times at specific sites in the human genome.80 
                                                
 77 Id. at 1363 (citations omitted). 
 78 Id. at 1364. 
 79 773 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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The number of repeats at any given locus varies from one 
individual to the next, and by analyzing multiple sites, a profile 
may be obtained that allows an individual to be identified.81 One 
difficulty with STR profiling is that, in order for it to be efficiently 
performed, PCR amplification at multiple sites must be 
simultaneously carried out and, historically, it has been difficult to 
find PCR primers that can be used together without adversely 
affecting one another’s effectiveness.82 
Promega owned (or had) an exclusive license to several patents 
that covered kits for STR profiling. In 2010, it brought suit before 
a jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Wisconsin alleging that Life Technologies had infringed upon 
these patents.83 One of the allegations made was that Life 
Technologies had violated § 271(f)(1) by shipping Taq polymerase 
from the United States to a Life Technologies facility in the United 
Kingdom where it was sold as part of STR profiling kits.84 In 
addition to the polymerase, the kits included a primer mix; a PCR 
reaction mix; a buffer solution; and control DNA.85 The jury found 
in favor of Promega on this issue and awarded damages based on 
the sales that had occurred overseas.86 This finding was vacated in 
a JMOL by the district court, and Promega appealed to the Federal 
Circuit.87 
A. Requirement for “All or a Substantial Portion of the 
Components” 
After ruling on issues concerning the validity of Promega’s 
claims,88 the Federal Circuit addressed the two primary findings on 
                                                                                                         
 80 Id. at 1342. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 1343–44. 
 84 Id. at 1345. 
 85 Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 During appeal, the Federal Circuit found most of the claims that Promega 
tried to enforce to be invalid due to their failure to meet the enablement 
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which the lower court had based its JMOL.89 The first of these 
concerned the requirement of § 271(f)(1) that an infringer must 
have supplied “all or a substantial portion of the components of a 
patented invention.”90 By comparing the language of § 271(b)91 and 
§ 271(f) and carrying out a textual analysis, the district court 
reached the conclusion that infringement under § 271(f) could not 
be the result of supplying only a single component of 
multicomponent invention.92 Since Life Technologies had only 
supplied Taq polymerase to a kit that had a total of five 
components, the court concluded that no infringement had 
occurred.93 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed based on the following 
reasoning: 
The dictionary definition of “substantial” is “important” or 
“essential.” A “portion” is defined as a “section or quantity 
within a larger thing; a part of a whole.” Nothing in the 
ordinary meaning of “portion” suggests that it necessarily 
requires a certain quantity or that a single component 
                                                                                                         
requirement of patentability. However, one claim survived and provided a basis 
for Promega’s assertions under § 271(f). This read as follows: 
42. A kit for analyzing polymorphism in at least one locus in a DNA 
sample, comprising: a) at least one vessel containing a mixture of 
primers constituting between 1 and 50 of said primer pairs; b) a vessel 
containing a polymerizing enzyme suitable for performing a primer-
directed polymerase chain reaction; c) a vessel containing the 
deoxynucleotide tri-phosphates adenosine, guanine, cytosine and 
thymidine; d) a vessel containing a buffer solution for performing a 
polymerase chain reaction; e) a vessel containing a template DNA 
comprising i) a simple or cryptically simple nucleotide sequence having 
a repeat motif length of 3 to 10 nucleotides and ii) nucleotide sequences 
flanking said simple or cryptically simple nucleotide sequence that are 
effective for annealing at least one pair of said primers, for assaying 
positive performance of the method.  
U.S. Patent No. RE37,984, col. 16 (filed Feb. 11, 2003). 
 89 Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., No. 10-cv-281-bbc, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 82708, at *10-15 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 9, 2010). 
 90 Id. at *10–13. 
 91 Section 271(b) is also concerned with inducing infringement, but requires 
there to have been direct infringement in the United States. 
 92 Life Techs., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82708, at *10-15. 
 93 Id. at *15. 
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cannot be a “portion” of a multi-component invention. 
Rather, the ordinary meaning of “substantial portion” 
suggests that a single important or essential component can 
be a “substantial portion of the components” of a patented 
invention . . . .94 
Taq polymerase is an enzyme used to amplify the DNA 
sequences in order to obtain enough replicated sample for 
testing. Without Taq polymerase, the genetic testing kit 
recited in the Tautz patent would be inoperable because no 
PCR could occur. LifeTech’s own witness admitted that the 
Taq polymerase is one of the “main” and “major” 
components of the accused kits. In short, there is evidence 
in the record to support the jury’s finding that a polymerase 
such as Taq is a “substantial portion” of the patented 
invention.95 
As a practical matter, there are at least two problems with this 
analysis. The first is that almost any component might be found to 
be “important” to an invention that it is a part of, and the only 
criteria provided by the court for determining exactly what this 
term means is that “important components” include those that are 
essential for the operability of an invention. For example, since the 
STR assays of the Life Technologies kits could not be carried out 
in the absence of the Taq polymerase, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that this enzyme, by itself, constitutes a substantial 
portion of the components in the assay kits.96 
While the court’s finding that the Taq polymerase is essential is 
certainly correct, it is also true that the assays could not have been 
performed in the absence of the primers, the reaction mix, or the 
buffer.97 The sole component of the kits that might be left out 
                                                
 94 Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(citations omitted). 
 95 Id. at 1353, 1356 (citations omitted). 
 96 Id. 
   97 PCR amplifications require primers to hybridize to specific DNA sequences 
and thereby set sites of amplification, a reaction mixture that contains reactants 
needed for the amplification to proceed and a buffer to suspend components and 
maintain the desired pH. PCR Amplification, PROMEGA CORP., 
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without completely destroying operability would be the DNA 
control sequences, and even these cannot be unequivocally 
identified as being outside the scope of § 271(f)(1) since the 
Federal Circuit did not suggest that only components that are 
essential to operability are “important.”98 The control sequences 
would certainly be “important” in the sense that they help to ensure 
the reliability of assays. Thus, the guidance provided by the court 
does little to help in determining whether a particular component 
might, by itself, trigger liability. 
The second problem with the Federal Circuit’s construction of 
“all or a substantial portion” was pointed out in the Amicus Brief 
for the United States filed in support of the Supreme Court 
granting certiorari in this case.99 Specifically, the Brief argues that 
defining this phrase as referring to a quantitative portion of 
components is actually more compatible with a textual analysis of 
the statute than defining it in terms of the relative importance of 
components: 
The term “substantial” can have either a quantitative 
meaning (“of ample or considerable amount”) or a 
qualitative meaning (“important”). Section 271(f)(1)’s 
context makes clear that the provision uses the term 
“substantial” in its quantitative sense. Section 271(f)(1) 
imposes liability for supplying “all or a substantial portion 
of the components” of the invention. 35 U.S.C. 271(f)(1) 
(emphases added). The term “all” necessarily carries a 
quantitative meaning: when used with a plural noun, “all” 
means “the whole of” or “the whole number of.” The term 
“portion” likewise invokes a quantity: “a part of any 
whole.” The phrase “all or a substantial portion of the 
components” therefore is most naturally read to include (1) 
                                                                                                         
https://www.promega.com/resources/product-guides-and-selectors/protocols-
and-applications-guide/pcr-amplification/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2017). 
 98 Life Techs., 773 F.3d at 1356. 
 99 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae On Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 14, at 16–17 (citations omitted). For arguments based on a 
comparison between the language used in § 271(f)(1) and § 272(f)(2), see Brief 
of the United States as Amicus Curiae On Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra 
note 14, at 17–19. 
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all of the components of a patented invention, and (2) a 
quantitatively substantial percentage of those components. 
In a five-component invention like the genetic testing kit at 
issue here, the single most important component might 
constitute a substantial portion of the invention, but it 
cannot constitute a substantial portion of the components.100 
Overall, the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the term “all or a 
substantial portion”101 leaves the basis for its presence in the statute 
unclear. As such, it is not a substantive requirement that a 
manufacturer might comfortably use as a basis for concluding that 
a prospective transfer will not be infringing. 
B. Requirement for Active Inducement 
The Federal Circuit also reviewed the district court’s finding 
that the requirement in § 271(f)(1) that an infringer must “actively 
induce the combination of components” means that there must be 
another party, unrelated to the infringer, that is the object of the 
inducement.102 Since Life Technologies just supplied Taq 
polymerase to a foreign branch of the same company, the district 
court concluded that no unrelated party existed and infringement 
had not occurred.103 
Again, the Federal Circuit reversed, stating: 
To begin, we acknowledge that the word “induce” can 
suggest that one is influencing or persuading “another.” 
However, induce also encompasses the more broad concept 
of “to bring about, to cause.” . . . The object of the 
transitive verb “induce” can either be a person or a thing, 
such as an activity or result. The statute is written such that 
an activity— “the combination”—is the object of “induce,” 
not a person. Had Congress wanted to limit “induce” to 
actions completed by two separate parties, it could easily 
have done so by assigning liability only where one party 
                                                
 100 Id. at 16–17 (citations omitted). 
 101 Life Techs., 773 F.3d at 1352. 
 102 Id. at 1351–53; see also Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., No. 10-cv-
281-bbc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82708, at *15-18 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 9, 2010). 
 103 Life Techs., 773 F.3d at 1351. 
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actively induced another “to combine the [patented] 
components.” Yet, “another” is absent from § 271(f)(1) . . . 
.104 
Given Congress’ choice of broadening language — which 
focuses solely on the activity abroad (“the combination”) 
rather than the actor performing the combination—and 
acknowledgment of “the need for a legislative solution to 
close a loophole” identified in Deepsouth, Legislative 
History, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5828, it is unlikely that 
Congress intended § 271(f)(1) to hold companies liable for 
shipping components overseas to third parties, but not for 
shipping those same components overseas to themselves or 
their foreign subsidiaries.105 
It should be noted that the court construes an activity (the 
making of the combination invention) and not infringement as 
being the object of inducing.106 It should also be noted that there is 
no indication that inducement to make the combination requires 
anything more than the sale of a component.107 These factors 
suggest that United States manufacturers supplying components to 
companies abroad may be liable even if they did not realize that a 
composition subsequently made and sold abroad was covered by a 
United States patent, even though they may have done nothing to 
encourage the assembly the infringing product beyond having 
supplied one or more components. 
IV. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
The decisions by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit 
discussed herein have given United States manufacturers a few 
clear benchmarks for determining when sales to foreign buyers can 
be carried out without creating a substantial risk of infringement 
under section § 271(f). Under current law, manufacturers will not 
infringe any claims to methods by selling components to products 
overseas or by providing information on how to perform a 
                                                
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 1352–53. 
 106 Id. at 1351. 
 107 Id. 
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method.108 Nor should there be infringement in situations in which 
material sent to a buyer is not used directly as part of an invention, 
but is only used to make copies that are incorporated into 
inventions.109 This may be used to exclude the transfer of software 
(as in Microsoft) and perhaps some types of biological inventions 
from creating a risk of infringement. 
Apart from transfers involving these factors, trying to reliably 
ascertain whether the transfer of a component to a foreign buyer 
may infringe § 271(f)(1) becomes much more complicated. One 
element in the statute that might be relied on in trying to find a 
basis for concluding that a sale can be safely made is the 
requirement that a manufacturer must have supplied a foreign 
entity with “all or a substantial portion of the components 
of a patented invention.”110 However, according to the Federal 
Circuit in its Life Technologies decision, even a single component 
may fulfill this requirement provided that it is important or 
essential to the operability of the invention.111 As previously 
discussed herein, this statutory construction could apply to almost 
any component and will therefore be essentially useless to a 
manufacturer trying to ascertain the risk associated with a sale. 
A second element in § 271(f)(1) that might provide a basis for 
limiting the scope of the statute is that components must be 
supplied “in such manner as to actively induce the combination of 
such components outside of the United States.”112 The requirement 
of active inducement also appears in § 271(b), a statute that differs 
from § 271(f) in that it is concerned with inducing direct 
infringement in the U.S. Nevertheless, there has historically been a 
tacit assumption that the requirement of active inducement is 
essentially the same in both statutes.113 
                                                
 108 See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1362 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
   109 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp, 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1757 (2007). 
 110 See Life Techs., 773 F.3d at 1356. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 1351. 
 113 This is important because the law surrounding 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012) 
has received a great deal of clarification in decisions by the United States 
Supreme Court, whereas § 271(f) has received relatively little attention. 
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The elements necessary for establishing an intent to induce 
infringement114 under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) were considered by the 
Federal Circuit in DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co.115 Part of this 
case was heard en banc with the objective of resolving prior 
conflicting decisions of the Federal Circuit regarding whether an 
inducer need only have had an intent to induce the acts that that led 
to infringement (in which case knowledge of infringement is not 
required) or whether the inducer must have had an intent to 
actually induce infringement itself.116 Citing Manville Sales Corp. 
v. Paramount Systems, Inc.,117 the DSU Medical Corp. court stated: 
The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged 
infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he knew 
or should have known his actions would induce actual 
infringements. The requirement that the alleged infringer 
knew or should have known his actions would induce 
actual infringement necessarily includes the requirement 
that he or she knew of the patent.118 
Later, the court further elaborated on the requirements for 
active inducement: 
To establish liability under section 271(b), a patent holder 
must prove that once the defendants knew of the patent, 
they “actively and knowingly aid[ed] and abett[ed] 
another’s direct infringement.” However, “knowledge of 
the acts alleged to constitute infringement” is not enough. 
The “mere knowledge of possible infringement by others 
                                                                                                         
Specifically, there have been four recent Supreme Court decisions addressing 
the meaning of inducement under § 271(b), but only in Microsoft was 
inducement under § 271(f) considered. 
 114 Although 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012) does not specify that intent is required 
to induce infringement, it has long been held to be a requirement. See Timothy 
R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 408 (2005). 
 115 See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (2006).  
 116 See Holbrook, supra note 8, at 1008. 
 117 Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys. Corp., 917 F.2d 544, 554 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990). 
 118 DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1304 (citations omitted). 
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does not amount to inducement; specific intent and action 
to induce infringement must be proven.”119 
Thus, it appears settled that infringement under § 271(b) is 
restricted to those instances in which there was bad intent 
involved. However, there is an important distinction between 
§ 271(b) and § 271(f). The former statute states that “[w]hoever 
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an 
infringer[,]”120 whereas the latter is concerned with actively 
inducing “the combination of such components outside of the 
United States in a manner that would infringe.”121 Just on its face, it 
would appear that § 271(f)’s language is much more in keeping 
with the view that all that is needed for a manufacturer to be liable 
is for it to have induced the actions on the part of a foreign 
purchaser. 
This view is also consistent with the way that the Federal 
Circuit discussed inducement in its recent Life Technologies 
decision. 
We first address whether “to actively induce the 
combination” requires involvement of a third party or 
merely the specific intent to cause the combination of the 
components of a patented invention outside the United 
States . . . . 
The object of the transitive verb “induce” can either be a 
person or a thing, such as an activity or result. The statute 
is written such that an activity — “the combination” — is 
the object of “induce,” not a person”122 
Neither this decision by the Federal Circuit nor the Microsoft 
decision by the United States Supreme Court ever mentions intent 
to induce infringement (as opposed to intent to induce the 
combination of an infringing composition) as a factor in 
determining liability. In Microsoft, the Court states: 
                                                
 119 Id. at 1305. 
 120 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 121 Id. § 271(f)(1) (emphasis added). 
 122 See Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (citations omitted). Note the absence of any suggestion of intent to induce 
infringement. 
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Section 271(f) prohibits the supply of components “from 
the United States . . . in such manner as to actively induce 
the combination of such components.” § 271(f)(1) 
(emphasis added). Under this formulation, the very 
components supplied from the United States, and not 
copies thereof, trigger § 271(f) liability when combined 
abroad to form the patented invention at issue.123 
If inducement under § 271(f) only means inducing the making 
of a combination, a manufacturer in the United States sending a 
component overseas that is then used in as part of composition will 
rarely know the degree to which these actions may be creating a 
potential for infringement under § 271(f) and, short of abandoning 
sales from the United States, will generally be able to do nothing to 
avoid liability.124 It also means that if the manufacturer is aware of 
a potentially problematic patent, it cannot use a good faith belief 
that the foreign composition was noninfringing as a means of 
exoneration. As far as can be told from case law, merely selling the 
component may be all that is needed to fulfill the § 271(f)(1) 
requirement for active inducement. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As previously noted, the Supreme Court is currently reviewing 
the Federal Circuit’s holding that the sale of a single commodity 
component of a multi-component invention may be an infringing 
act under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).125 A reversal of the Federal Circuit 
would provide manufacturers with an additional benchmark that 
they can use in concluding that some sales can be made to foreign 
buyers without incurring substantial risks of infringement. 
However, a great deal of uncertainty will remain in instances 
where it is unclear whether a component being sold actually 
qualifies as a commodity or where the manufacturer needs to sell 
more than a single component. 
                                                
 123 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1757 (2007) (emphasis 
added). 
 124 Reasons for this include the possibility of there being unidentified United 
States patents relevant to products made abroad and a lack of control concerning 
what foreign purchasers do. 
 125 See Life Techs., 773 F.3d at 1341. 
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What is needed is for Congress to repeal § 271(f) entirely. To 
the extent that the statute had any merit at the beginning (and it is 
not clear that it did), it has none today. Two of the justifications for 
passing the bill were that it would improve the United States trade 
deficit and protect United States jobs. In fact, the bill does the 
opposite. It puts United States manufacturers in a position where 
they must consider how goods that they sell overseas will be used. 
If the goods are combined in a way that would infringe a United 
States patent on a device or composition, there is a possibility that 
the manufacturer will be facing a lawsuit and exposure to 
substantial damages. This is true even though infringement only 
occurs in a theoretical sense (composition claims in United States 
patents do not normally cover products made and sold outside of 
the US) and even though the United States manufacturer cannot 
control, and has not directly benefited from, the sale of the foreign 
products. Thus, legislation that was supposed to promote the 
export of United States goods and protect United States jobs has, 
ironically, created a problem for manufacturers that can most 
easily be solved by these manufacturers either abandoning foreign 
sales entirely or moving the production of goods outside of the US. 
One underlying motivation that drove the passage of the 
statute, that patent holders were being cheated of rights due to a 
loophole in the law, does not seem to have a clear factual basis. 
The statute imposes liability when no product has been made, used, 
or sold in the United States that would affect a patent owner’s 
profits, and the ability of the patent owner to enforce its rights 
against a foreign company that attempts to sell an infringing 
product in the United States has not been compromised. If the 
United States patent owner also has patents in foreign countries, 
then these can still be enforced. If the patent owner has not pursued 
patent protection in those countries or has been unable to secure 
such rights, then what is there to justify holding a United States 
manufacturer, a party that did not even make the sales, liable? 
Perhaps at the time that the legislation establishing § 271(f) 
was enacted, the thought was that, if a foreign company could not 
buy components made in the U.S., it would not be able to make 
products containing those components and foreigners would have 
no choice but to buy higher value United States goods. There does 
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not appear to be anything in the congressional record that actually 
supports such a view, but even if it was true in 1984, it certainly is 
not today. A foreign company that cannot buy a component made 
in the United States will simply buy it elsewhere. The only things 
affected will be the sale of components by United States 
companies and the jobs derived from those sales. 
 
